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As climate policies change through the legislative process, public attitudes towards them may change 
as well. Therefore, it is important to assess how people accept and support controversial climate policies 
as the policies change over time. Policy acceptance is a positive evaluation of, or attitude towards, an 
existing policy1–3 ; policy support adds an active behavioural component1,3 . Acceptance does not necessarily 
lead to support. We conducted a national survey of Australian residents to investigate acceptance of, and 
support for, the Australian carbon pricing policy before and after the 2013 federal election, and how 
perceptions of the policy, economic ideology, and voting behaviour affect acceptance and support. We found 
acceptance and support were stable across the election period, which was surprising given that climate 
policy was highly contentious during the election. Policy acceptance was higher than policy support at 
both times and acceptance was a necessary but insufficient condition of support. We conclude that acceptance 
is an important process through which perceptions of the policy and economic ideology influence support. 
Therefore, future climate policy research needs to distinguish between acceptance and support to better 
understand this process, and to better measure these concepts.  
 
The acceptability of an environmental policy usually increases between planning and 
implementation4–6 . This pattern is also evident in controversial health policies such as smoking 
restrictions7 , but is not well established in the climate policy literature, where researchers have 
measured acceptability, acceptance, and/or support for climate policies only at single time points1,8 . 
Increased acceptance and support may be due to increased familiarity9,10 with the policy or the 
realization that prior anxieties regarding perceived negative outcomes of the policy were unfulfilled4 . 
 
The role elections play in changing policy support and acceptance is poorly understood. We 
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examined changes in support for, and acceptance of, Australia’s carbon pricing policy using data 
collected a fortnight before and a fortnight after the 2013 federal election. The policy was a heated 
topic of debate during the election campaign. Regardless of familiarity processes, changes in carbon 
policy support and acceptance may reflect or drive changes in the government, but the literature 
does not lend itself to any firm hypothesis. If the newly elected government had sought to overturn an 
existing policy as part of its election platform, we may expect support and acceptance to diminish. If 
the incumbent government, which had introduced the policy, were re-elected, we may expect 
support and acceptance to increase. Many processes may account for such changes. People may 
alter their views to align with newly discovered population norms11 , they may seek to resolve 
cognitive dissonance arising from differences between their views and the new status quo12,13 , or 
their views may become stronger because of greater perceived consensus for their own views11 . 
 
Policy acceptability, acceptance and support have been used interchangeably within the 
literature, but represent distinct constructs1–3 . Disagreement also exists within the policy and 
renewable energy technology (RET) literature regarding the definition of these constructs. Some 
authors distinguish among these terms on an attitudinal/behavioural dimension1–3,14 but, even so, 
do not agree which terms correspond to attitudes and which to behaviours. Acceptability has been 
said to correspond to attitudes and acceptance to behaviour14 ; conversely, acceptance to attitudes 
and support to behaviours1–3 . Also, the terms have been distinguished temporally (that is, before 
(acceptability) and after (acceptance) implementation), while being unaligned with the 
attitudinal/behavioural dimension15 . Different types of RET acceptance have also been proposed—
socio-political acceptance, market acceptance, and community acceptance16 . 
 
Research measuring acceptance and support as distinct constructs shows that levels of 
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acceptance are higher than support for the carbon policy in Australia1 , fuel economy standards in 
the United States3 , and energy infrastructure in the United Kingdom and Norway2 . However, 
measurement concerns such as using a single item to measure the construct with different 
response formats1 , or using the term ‘in favour of ’ as a proxy for support in a two-item measure2 , 
highlight the need for additional research. 
 
Based on earlier work1 , we operationalize policy acceptance as a function of attitudes 
towards a policy at a given time (after implementation), and policy support as a function of 
acceptance with an additional behavioural component (action or intent). This conceptual 
formulation can also be extended to RET and suggests that acceptance may be a precondition of 
support. (Note that acceptability is also function of attitudes, but exists before policy 
implementation.) 
 
Perceived effectiveness and fairness have both been linked to the acceptability (acceptance) 
of a proposed (implemented) environmental policy and support of a policy: greater perceived 
fairness/effectiveness leads to greater acceptability, acceptance and/or support1,3,4,17 . Other 
individual characteristics are important too. For example, free-market ideology (FMI) describes the 
belief that markets should be allowed to operate unrestrained by government regulations; the 
market will resolve any problems through supply and demand dynamics18 . Individuals endorsing a 
FMI are unlikely to accept or support climate policies1,3 because these policies are governmental 
regulations seeking to minimize negative market externalities (greenhouse gas emissions). 
 
In Australia, climate action has been heatedly debated, with both Labor and Liberal 
governments advancing and regressing action19–21 . The Clean Energy Legislative Package (CELP, also 
4  
known as the carbon pricing policy, or inaccurately but more commonly as the carbon tax) was 
enacted in July 2012 by the Labor-led Australian federal government. The government sought to hold 
about 500 large industries responsible for the emissions they release by introducing a carbon price 
which would, in time, function as an emissions trading scheme (ETS) tied to the European Union’s 
ETS. The government also created a compensation package for households indirectly impacted by 
the carbon price. At the time of policy implementation, the Opposition coalition strongly opposed 
the policy, instead favouring other measures such as market incentives. However, in the past years, 
leaders of the Liberal party (that is, Tirnbull, Howard) have supported an ETS (refs 19-21). 
 
In June 2013, Kevin Rudd replaces Julia Gilard as leader of the Labor Party, thus becoming 
Prime Minister, and announced plans to fast forward the ETS, owing to high living costs19. The ETS 
was linked to the European Union’s ETS one year earlier than planned, creating a floating market-
based price for carbon, instead of a fixed price. The CELP and associated ETS was later repealed in 
July 2014, after the conservation Liberal-National Party coalition won government in the September 
2013 federal election, and Tony Abbot became the new Prime Minister. A new Direct Action Plan 
was enacted, in which an Emissions Reduction Fund provides incentives for abatement activities22.  
 
We investigated whether the 2013 Australian federal election affected levels of acceptance 
and support for the Australian carbon policy. The carbon Policy was a key election issue, with 
different carbon policy outcomes depending on the election results. We measured acceptance and 
support of the carbon policy two weeks before (Time 1-T1 and two weeks after (Time 2-T2) the 
election through an online questionnaire distributed to a national sample of the Australian 
residents. We tested the following hypotheses: acceptance will be higher than support; acceptance 
and support will change between T1 and T2; and acceptance is necessary precondition of support 
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(as one must accept a policy to support it). 
 
At both T1 and T2, policy acceptance was significantly higher than support (T1: t(515)=9.68, 
p<0.001; T2: t(515)=11.64, p< 0.001) and, surprisingly, acceptance and support were unchanged by 
the election (repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA); acceptance: F(1,515)=1.44, p> 0.10, 
support: F(1,515)=0.01, p> 0.10; see Table 1). Although acceptance and support levels varied 
predictably with the political party voted for, the basic findings of higher levels of acceptance than 
support and lack of change over time were consistent across party choice (see Table 1 and Methods 
for complete analysis). 
 
Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses for T2 respondents (N=785), we tested 
whether perceived effectiveness, perceived fairness and FMI (all centred at the mean; entered on 
Step 1) and the interactions among these variables (entered on Step 2) predicted policy acceptance 
or support (see Table 2 and Methods for information on covariates, which did not impact the 
regression). Only the main effects were significant in these models (Acceptance: Step 1 adjusted 
R2=0.77, F(3,781)=873.65, p < 0.001; Support: Step 1 adjusted R2=0.69, F(3,781)=571.03, p < 0.001). 
As predicted, greater perceived fairness and effectiveness were associated with increased 
acceptance and support of the policy, whereas greater FMI was and support of the policy (see Table 
2). The addition of the interaction terms on Step 2 of these analyses failed to increase the 
amount of variance explained in either model (Δ𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑐
2 = 0.00, Δ𝑅𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
2 = 0.00; although one 
interaction term (fairness * effectiveness) in the support model was significant, it failed to 
significantly increase the variance explained).  
 
To examine our hypothesis that acceptance is a necessary precondition for support, we first 
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cross-tabulated the distributions of acceptance and support among all participants at T2 (Methods 
and Supplementary Table 1; see Batel et al. 2013, for a similar analytic strategy, applied to a 
different context). For most respondents, acceptance and support aligned (accepting and 
supporting (33.2%); not accepting and not supporting (21.4%) or neutral on both (29%)). In our 
sample, 2.8% of respondents accepted, but did not support the policy. Only 0.4% supported the 
policy but did not accept it. Starker evidence comes from comparing the proportion of those who 
accepted the policy from among those who supported it (92.2%) and the proportion of those who 
supported the policy from among those who accepted it (71.7%). These comparisons suggest 
acceptance is a necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for policy support—again highlighting 
these are two separate constructs. 
 
A cross-lagged correlation analysis23 bolsters this conclusion: there was a significant difference 
between the correlation of acceptance at T1 with support at T2 (controlling for support at T1) and 
support at T1 and acceptance at T2 (controlling for acceptance at T1; r ’s=0.32 and 0.17 respectively; 
z=2.10, p< 0.05), suggesting acceptance precedes support (see Methods for details). 
 
We further tested whether acceptance is a necessary precondition of support with a mediation 
analysis using AMOS with bootstrap estimation of the indirect effects (5,000 samples) among all 
respondents at T2. As shown in Fig. 1, we specified acceptance as the mediator and support as the 
dependent variable, with fairness, effectiveness and FMI as correlated predictors. Initial model 
testing revealed a better model fit constraining the direct path from FMI to support to 0, therefore 
this path was omitted from the final model. Results indicated a good model fit, accounting for 
77% of the variance in support(𝑋2(1) = 1.11, 𝑝 = 0.29; comparative fit index (CFI)=1.00, root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=0.01 (CI:0.00, 0.10); standardized root mean square 
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residual (SRMR)=0.004). Acceptance was a significant mediator of all three predictors, as the 95% 
bias-corrected confidence intervals (CIs) for the indirect effect did not contain 0 (FMI: -0.09, CI: -0.20, 
-0.10; fairness: 0.26, CI: 0.21, 0.33; effectiveness: 0.28, CI:0.22,0.34). An alternative model 
transposing acceptance and support did not fit the data as well (χ2(1)=35.33, p=0.00; CFI=0.98, 
RMSEA=0.21 (CI: 0.15, 0.27); SRMR=0.02), thus the current model is preferred. This suggests that 
acceptance is an important process through which FMI, fairness and effectiveness influence 
support. Fairness and effectiveness maintained significant, positive, direct effects in the presence of 
acceptance, whereas FMI did not. 
Society-wide actions on climate change require broad acceptance and support of government 
policies and interventions. Our analyses offer novel evidence to conclude that acceptance is a 
necessary but not sufficient precondition of support, generally stronger than sup- port (support 
adding behavioural elements), and an important process through which FMI, fairness and 
effectiveness influence support. Together, this reinforces earlier results highlighting the necessity of 
measuring acceptance and support as distinct constructs1-3, while eliminating past measurement 
concerns (through measuring multiple items for each construct on similar response scales).  
 
Although we have identified one important process, there may be others, not measured here, 
that should be explored. To do so, future climate policy research needs to measure acceptance and 
support as distinct constructs while investigating other variables. Furthermore, those who do not 
support the policy do not necessarily oppose it. Future research should attempt to disentangle 
opposition from lack of support, ambivalence from apathy, and ‘rejection’ from ‘resistance’24. 
 
Our second major conclusion relates to the stability of acceptance and support for Australia’s 
proposed carbon pricing policy during a significant electoral upheaval where climate policy was an 
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important area of contention. The lack of change was independent of party choice. Possibly, the 
stability of acceptance and support are related to the ambiguity around policy alternatives. 
Participants at T2 may have known that Abbott would try to repeal the CELP and institute the 
Direct Action Plan, but they would not have known the specifics of the alternative, as they were not 
released until after the survey. 
 
Evaluation of the acceptance or support of a current policy should happen in a comparative 
policy context rather than in isolation from competing policy options. A limitation of our study is 
that we were unable to assess support and acceptability of the Direct Action Plan, and its perceived 
fairness and effectiveness, as the policy details were unknown at the time of the study and hence 
could not be included. The more fair and effective a policy is perceived to be, the more likely it is 
to be accepted and supported, therefore participation and/or procedural justice (a type of 
fairness) may be a key concern25,26 for future climate action. Research in many sustainability 
domains has considered the important role of participation, such as in planning and decision-
making in renewable energy technology24 , for sustainability science and community-based 
participatory research27 , and in the implementation of European climate targets28 . The CELP 
was specifically designed to address distributive justice issues via the household compensation 
plan; as such, we measured the distributive justice aspects of fairness in our study. Future 
studies should address participation and procedural justice concerns, if they are applicable for 
the climate policy. 
 
Some policy-implementation implications arising from our study include the importance of 
ensuring public acceptance to undergird support. This can be done by, for example, 
communicating normative information29,30 —in Australia, the carbon pricing legislation was not as 
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unpopular as many, especially on the conservative side of Australian politics claimed, with nearly 
half of the population finding the policy acceptable and providing further evidence of pluralistic 
ignorance11 . However, that level of acceptance did not translate into effective support through the 
election. Clearly, policy acceptance does not equate to support (although it does mediate it), 
especially in contested arenas such as elections, where many issues are conflated into a single 
electoral point. 
 
Methods 
 
We used a within-subjects online survey experiment to investigate changes in support and 
acceptance before (T1) and after (T2) the 2013 federal election with Australian adults representing 
metropolitan, regional and rural areas online. Participants were recruited from a research-only panel 
administered by the research company ORU (http://www.theoru.com). ORU is an online fieldwork 
company with QSOAP Gold Standard and new global ISO 26363 standard accreditations. Through multi-
source and multichannel recruiting, ORU has a database of more than 300,000 individuals from across 
Australia. Participants were entered into a prize draw as an incentive to complete the survey. T1 
surveying occurred approximately two weeks before the election in August 2013, and T2 occurred 
approximately two weeks after the election. Only T1 participants willing to be contacted at T2 were 
retained for data analysis (N=772, 384 males, 388 females). The T1 (T2) survey was open for six (seven) 
days before we reached the desired minimum sample size of 750. 
 
In addition, we used between-subjects design to measure testing bias. Testing bias was assessed to 
ensure that participating in the survey before the election did not influence the responses of those same 
participants (within-subjects) after the election. Post-election results from an independent sample taken 
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at T2 were compared against the within-subjects sample at T2 and no significant differences were found 
on measures of acceptance or support (p’s > 0.05), indicating there were no testing effects for our 
online survey. 
 
For T1, we sent 14,500 invites via email within the panel. Of these, 1,551 respondents clicked the 
link from their computers, resulting in a 48.8% cooperation rate, and 5.3% response rate. For T2 we re-
contacted the 772 T1 participants and recruited new participants. At T2, N=785 (388 males, 397 
females); 516 were T1 participants and 269 were new participants. There was a 72.6% cooperation rate; 
66.8% response rate within the T1 sample (772 invites sent, 711 click-ins), and a 55% cooperation rate; 
5.7% response rate for those who were new at T2 (4,700 invites sent, 489 click-ins). 
Questionnaires differed slightly for T1 and T2, reflecting prior consent and the recent change in 
government. Our measures are described below (see Supplementary Information for questionnaire). Our 
method is, in part, based on past work1 , but improves on certain limitations by utilizing the same 
response format to measure multiple items for acceptance and support. In addition, our analytical 
approach differs from that past work. Unless noted, items were measured on five-point response scales. 
 
Free-market ideology (FMI).  
 
We measured FMI using the FMI scale in ref. 18 (see Supplementary Information), presenting items in 
random order to each participant. Responses were coded so a higher score aligned with endorsement of 
a FMI. 
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Policy acceptance and support.  
 
To ensure participants had a basic policy knowledge, the survey included a brief summary of the 
carbon policy taken from the government website. Next, acceptance and support items were randomly 
presented to each participant, along with the fairness and effectiveness items. The acronym CELP is used 
here for brevity, but was spelt out within questionnaire items. 
 
We measured acceptance with four statements: ‘How acceptable do you find the CELP?’, ‘To what 
extent are you in favour for or against the CELP?’, ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
implementation of the CELP?’ and ‘Do you prefer having the current carbon policy in place, as opposed 
to no carbon policy?’. Scores were averaged; higher numbers indicate greater acceptance (T1: α = 
0.95; T2: α = 0.95).  
Support was measured with three statements: ‘How supportive are you of the carbon policy (The 
CELP)?’, ‘How willing are you to bear some of the costs resulting from the implementation of the CELP?’, 
‘How willing are you to take action to voice a positive opinion about the CELP, such as writing a letter or 
calling a representative?’. Scores were averaged; higher numbers indicate greater support (T1: α = 0.79; 
T2: α = 0.82). 
 
Perceived fairness and effectiveness.  
 
Perceived fairness and effectiveness were each measured by two items: ‘How fair do you think it is 
that some big industries now must pay for the carbon they emit, as mandated by the carbon pricing 
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policy?’, How fair do you think the compensation plan is for those affected by increased costs due to the 
carbon price?’, ‘How effective do you think the carbon pricing policy will be to help lower carbon 
emissions from industries in Australia?’, ‘How effective do you think the compensation plan is in 
reducing the financial impact of the carbon price on individuals?’. The two items for each measure were 
strongly correlated with each other (T1: reff=0.65, rfair=0.54; T2: reff=0.65, rfair=0.49; p’s < 0.01), supporting 
our decision to take the average of the two items as our measures of fairness and effectiveness. 
Higher numbers indicate greater fairness/effectiveness. 
 
Voting preferences and behaviour.  
 
At T1 we asked ‘Which political party are you most likely to vote for in the next federal election?’; 
and at T2 ‘In the recent federal election for the House of Representatives, which of the following did you 
vote for?’ and ‘To which party did you give your second preference ?’. Response categories were: Labor 
Party, Liberal Party. National Party. Green Party, Independent, Family First, Other, Prefer not to say. 
Additionally, there was an ‘I don’t know’ category at T1. 
 
Demographics.  
 
We assessed gender, income, age and education. Six response categories were included for 
income, varying from ‘0–$18,200’ to ‘$180,001 and over.’ These categories were chosen to replicate 
the cutoff points for the compensation package within the carbon policy, based on household 
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incomes established by the Australian Government. Additionally, we included a ‘prefer not to 
respond’ category. 
 
Acceptance and support.  
 
During both time periods, policy acceptance was higher than support. Of the 516 participants 
who completed both surveys, 46.3% found the policy acceptable, 28.1% unacceptable, and 25.6% 
were neutral or ambivalent at T1. In contrast, 35.9% supported the policy, 33.5% did not support the 
policy, and 30.6% were neutral or ambivalent. At T2, 45.7% found the policy acceptable, 25.4% 
unacceptable, and 28.9% were neutral or ambivalent. In contrast, 36.4% supported the policy, 33.3% 
did not support the policy, and 30.2% were neutral or ambivalent. These findings were further 
supported by significant mean differences between acceptance and support for both time periods 
(Table 1). As hypothesized, participants showed greater acceptance than support of the policy at T1 
(t(515)=9.68, p< 0.001) and T2 (t(515)=11.64, p< 0.001). Both acceptance and support were stable 
across the election time: a repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant change in acceptance or 
support from T1 to T2, (p’s > 0.05). 
 
Covariates.  
 
Preliminary regression analyses for covariates revealed that age and gender were not 
significantly related to support or acceptance—and were therefore dropped from subsequent 
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analyses. Education and income were significant predictors of acceptance (b=0.14, p< 0.01; b= -0.11, 
p< 0.05) and education was a significant predictor of support (b=0.19, p< 0.01). As the inclusion of 
these variables did not affect the significance of other variables within the hierarchical multiple 
regression models, they were removed from the models for sake of parsimony and comparability. In 
addition, education and income were analysed for repeated-measures effects, to see if the covariates 
influenced changes in acceptance or support over time. No covariate significantly impacted the 
relationship of acceptance or support over time. Therefore, the covariates were excluded from 
analysis of variance procedures. 
 
Analysis of variance by voting.  
 
Political party voting intention at T1 was closely split between the Labor Party (n= 148, 28.7%) 
and the Liberal Party (n=146, 28.3%), with the remainder spread among smaller parties. At T2, self-
reported first preference votes (the political party to which the participants gave their first vote to) 
were equally split between the Labor Party (n=164) and the Liberal Party (n=165), with other parties in 
smaller quantities (Table 1). 
 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to see whether supporters of different political 
parties significantly differed in carbon policy acceptance and support. This analysis included only 
Labor, Liberal and Greens Party supporters owing to small cell sizes of other categories and lack of 
comparability for ‘prefer not to say’ or ‘other.’ The analyses revealed significant main effects for 
voting behaviour on acceptance and support and both T1 and T2 (Acceptance: F(2,373) = 79.99, 
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p< 0.001; F(2,373) = 73.46, p< 0.001, respectively; Support: F(2,373) = 66.81, p<0.001; 
F(2,373)=57.68, p<0.001, respectively). Tukey's HSD tests showed significant differences between 
Greens and Liberal supporters, and Liberal and Labor supporters at T1 and T2, as well as Greens and 
Labor at T2, but only for support (p's<0.05) (Table 1). Highest levels of acceptance and support of 
the carbon policy occurred in Greens Party supporters at both T1 and T2, whereas Liberal Party 
supporters reported the lowest levels of acceptance and support. Paired samples t-tests indicated 
no changes in acceptance or support from T1 to T2 for Labor, Liberal or Greens supporters 
(p's<0.05). 
 
Cross-lagged correlations.  
 
Owing to high zero-order correlation between the acceptance and support at both time periods, 
we computed cross-lagged correlations on the residuals23,31. In effect, we used the correlation 
between acceptance at T1 with support at T2, while controlling for support at T1 (racc1supp2.supp1 ) and 
the correlation between support at T1 and acceptance at T2, while controlling for acceptance at T1 
(rsupp1acc2.acc1 ), along with the two synchronous correlations of the residuals (racc1supp1 and racc2supp2 ), 
and the two autocorrelations of the residuals (racc1acc2 and rsupp1supp2 ) to test the equality of the 
cross-lagged correlations
23 using our within-subjects sample (N 516). We find that the cross-lagged 
correlations of the residuals are significantly different from each other (racc1supp2.supp1 =0.32, 
rsupp1acc2.acc1=0.17, z=2.10, p< 0.05; ref. 32), giving further evidence supporting the argument hat 
acceptance of a policy is a precondition for support (that is, indicates causality). 
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Figure 1   Path model. This model shows acceptance mediating the effects of FMI, effectiveness and 
fairness with standardized regression estimates. The curved lines indicate covariance and associated 
correlation. All paths are significant, p’s<0.01. 
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